

46 2013), as done in ABMs. This paper attempts to enrich the literature by developing a dynamic
47 SEM and focusing on the behavioral and policy implications of added complexity and dynamics.
48

49 While land use representation has improved in recent SEMs, such models still not reflect the land
50 use realities. In theoretical urban economic models, the monocentric model endogenizes
51 residential lot size (or housing size) and distance to workplace in residents' utility functions, in
52 order to solve for the spatial distribution of residential densities (Alonso, 1964; Brueckner,
53 1987). Non-monocentric models can simulate an additional land use feature, employment density
54 (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Zhang and Kockelman, 2014), by
55 recognizing that firms often prefer locations closer to each other. Such agglomeration effects
56 generate different technology benefits across locations. In applied SEMs, urban spatial structure
57 is often organized and represented by zones and thus more land use characteristics can be
58 considered. For example, some models allow for different building types (or land use types) and
59 access to daily goods and services (measured via time and money costs) (Anas and Liu, 2007).
60

61 Many empirical studies find that land use or building environment attributes affect people's
62 activity and travel choices of households and business. These land use characteristics are often
63 summarized as three *Ds*: density, diversity, and design (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997), later
64 extended to five *Ds*, by adding distance to transit and destination accessibility (Ewing and
65 Cervero, 2001), and then seven *Ds*, by adding demand management and demographics (Ewing et
66 al., 2010). Such land use characteristics are regularly included in residential mobility studies and
67 the hedonic analysis of property values (e.g., Song and Knaap, 2004; Löchl and Axhausen,
68 2010). Thus, it is important to include more land use characteristics in applied SEMs, to avoid
69 mis-estimation of local travel decision, land use patterns, and community welfare.
70

71 In addition, urban dynamics is often ignored by SEMs. Many SEMs are static equilibrium
72 models (e.g., monocentric models): they assume that market-clearing processes simultaneously
73 resolve in one shot and external factors and shocks are absent. To address such limitations, the
74 dynamic SEM developed here emphasizes land use complexity and dynamics. The starting point
75 is Anas and Liu's (2007) zone-based computable general equilibrium model called "RELU"¹, for
76 Regional Economy, and Land Use. In RELU, a consumer's utility is associated with his/her
77 home neighborhood's land use features, including home floor space (the inverse of residential
78 density) and access to workplace and daily goods and services. In RELU, a firm's output is a
79 function of floor space and the access to the intermediate inputs from basic industries. RELU
80 also summarizes other land use information and zonal features into an exogenous variable,
81 representing the constant "inherent" attractiveness of each zone to consumers and firms. In
82 addition, RELU endogenously models the dynamics of real estate development and treats
83 developers as having perfect-foresight and thus able to perfectly predict future asset prices (e.g.,
84 looking forward 1 year). The RELU model is thus a stationary dynamic equilibrium model, in
85 which all the exogenous variables have no change over time.
86

87 Spatial dynamics in the model proposed in this extension of RELU come from three key factors.
88 The first is a change of demographics and zonal attractiveness, which are exogenously given.

¹ An updated version, RELU-TRAN2, is developed in Anas and Hiramatsu (2012). When compared to RELU-TRAN, RELU-TRAN2 adds the choice of vehicle fuel economy into consumers' utility functions and so internalizes people's gasoline use.

89 Many U.S. cities are experiencing falling household sizes and population growth, which will
90 affect present and future housing, neighborhood, and community preferences (Nelson, 2006;
91 2013). Moreover, each location’s attractiveness will vary with improvements in or degradation of
92 local amenities, such as public transit infrastructure, bicycling and walking facilities, parks, and
93 schools. The second feature relates to building stock conversions. Unlike RELU, our model
94 assumes that building stocks evolve, changing year to year; they do not stay constant. The third
95 feature is the endogenous change of locational (zone-based) externalities. Here, we define two
96 types of positive location externalities that affect households and firms, respectively. The
97 “externality” affecting households’ residential location choices is assumed to be land use
98 diversity (in the form of land use mixing and job-population ratios), and the externality affecting
99 firm location choices is an innovation-based agglomeration economy. These externalities are
100 evolve in a dynamic context, due to the relocation of households and firms; over time, they tend
101 to stimulate new relocation and re-development.

102
103 This dynamic SEM was calibrated in the metropolitan city of Austin, Texas, with 38 zones, and
104 used to explore changes in land use and rent dynamics from year 2010 to 2035. The applications
105 are based on four scenarios, with different land use preferences and zoning regulations in place.
106 The following three sections introduce the model’s specification, calibration, solution
107 algorithms, and simulation results. The paper concludes with a discussion of findings.

108 109 **THE MODEL**

110 *Spatial and Temporal Context of the City*

111 The city is divided into N_z model zones, representing districts of the considered region. Land use
112 in the city is categorized into N_r types of residential use (e.g., low- and high-density single- and
113 multi-family residential use), N_f types of land use for firms (e.g., low- and high-density
114 commercial and industrial uses), and N_o types of other uses, including land use for civil,
115 transportation, and open-space functions. Thus, there are in total $N_{lu} (= N_r + N_f + N_o)$ types of
116 land use. The land used for residences and firms is endogenously determined, while the amounts
117 used for other functions are exogenously given and will stay constant if no specific regulations or
118 policies leading to land use change are imposed.

119
120 Urban subsystems evolve at different rates (Wegener, 2004). For example, land uses and
121 transport networks change relatively slowly, while household locations choices, wages, and rents
122 move faster. To reflect some of this diversity, two time scales are used here (Figure 1). The first
123 scale, representing relatively slow change, is indexed by T , while the second scale, representing
124 faster change, is indexed by t . Following the first scale, new construction and demolition are
125 finished at the end of period $T-1$ and realized by households at the beginning of period T . Thus,
126 households are assumed to update their understanding of the land use diversity of their
127 neighborhood at the beginning of period T , relying on the changed land use stocks. During the
128 period T , both the land stocks and the households’ understandings of neighborhood diversity stay
129 constant, until a new update at the early period of $T+1$ occurs. Meanwhile, technology diffuses
130 locally at the beginning of period T . During the period T , firms determine their investments in
131 innovation, leading to a new technology at the end of period T . In the second scale, each period T
132 is divided into several time steps, from t_T to $t_T + \mathcal{T}$. Households in each time step t_T decide
133 whether to move and/or change jobs and where to relocate. Meanwhile, job distribution, goods

134 prices, land rents, asset prices, and wages are altered and adjusted by the market in each time
 135 step, until they reach market equilibria.

136 [Figure 1 about here]

137 **Households**

138 While the RELU model categorizes households (or consumers) based on skill levels only, the
 139 model in this paper develops a more detailed typology of households, relying on both
 140 households' lifecycles and their skill levels. Compared to skill levels, the household's lifecycle is
 141 probably more sensitive to their housing and neighborhood preference and demographic changes.
 142 For example, Nelson (2013) defined three types of households that may have different housing
 143 and neighborhood preferences, including starter-home, peak-demand, and downsizing
 144 households. Specifically, the starter-home households (whose household heads are under 35
 145 years of age) often have higher demand for homes with smaller floorspaces or townhouses and
 146 apartments. The peak-demand households (35–64 years old), who have growing families and
 147 need more space, often prefer larger-lot single-family housing. The downsizing households (over
 148 65 years old) likely no longer need large homes and thus may prefer smaller houses or
 149 apartment. Also, while the share of the population with different skill levels may not change
 150 much in future, the share of households in different lifecycles may significantly change in the
 151 future. Nelson (2013) predicted that the starter-home and downsizing households will account
 152 for about 84% of the new housing market from 2010 to 2035; these types of households prefer
 153 more mixed-use, walkable, amenity-rich neighborhoods and multi-family housing types than do
 154 those peak-demand households.

155
 156 Households in the city are thus subdivided into n_h types relying on their lifecycle (e.g., starter-
 157 home, peak-demand, and downsizing). Every household activity is assumed to be performed by a
 158 single representative household member, which is a potential worker with s ($s = 1, \dots, N_s$) level
 159 of working skill. In total, there are n_{hs} ($= n_h \times n_s$) household types. The number of households
 160 Ω_{hs}^T of type hs in the city and its development over the first scale T ($T = T_0, T_1, \dots$) are
 161 exogenously given. In each time step t ($t = t_T, t_{T+1}, \dots, t_{T+T}$) of the period T , each household
 162 type hs choosing zone i ($i = 1, \dots, n_z$) for residences, zone j ($j = 1, \dots, n_z$) for workplace, and
 163 housing building type k ($k = 1, \dots, n_r$) will generate a flow utility, $U_{ijk|hs}^t$, as follows:

164
 165 (1)
$$U_{ijk|hs}^t(C^t, q^t, D_i^T) = \alpha_{hs} \ln(\sum_{\forall z} \iota_{z|ijhs} (C_z^t)^{\eta_{hs}})^{1/\eta_{hs}} + \beta_{hs} \ln q^t + f(D_{i1}^T, D_{i2}^T \mathbb{A}_i^T) + I_{ijk|hs} + \varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^t$$

166 where

- 167
 168 C_z^t is the quantity of retail goods the consumer purchases from zone z , in time step t ;
 169 q^t is the size of floor space in the chosen type k housing in zone i , in time step t ;
 170 D_{i1}^T, D_{i2}^T are the endogenously determined variables of land use mix and job-population
 171 ratio, representing the locational externalities in zone i in period T ;
 172 \mathbb{A}_i^T is a vector of exogenous local amenity variables of zone i in period T ;
 173 $I_{ijk|hs}$ is exogenous inherent attractiveness of the residence-workplace-housing choice
 174 (i, j, k);
 175 α_{hs}, β_{hs} are the elasticities of utility with respect to the retail goods and housing floor
 176 space (which are constant over time) and $\alpha_{hs} + \beta_{hs} = 1$; and
 177 $\varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^t$ is the random error term of choice (i, j, k).

178

179 The utility function shown in Eq. (1) is similar to that of the RELU model. One major difference
 180 is that Eq. (1) introduces the land use mix variable as a proxy for the location externality and
 181 local amenity of residential zones, better tackling land use complexity. Specifically, the vector of
 182 local amenities \mathbb{A}_i^T can include variables representing the natural advantage or disadvantage of
 183 each location (such as proximity to lakes and rivers, and site topography), open space, school
 184 quality, public transit infrastructure, and other civil and cultural facilities. The formation and
 185 evolution of a neighborhood's land use diversity is a dynamic process. Figure 1 illustrates the
 186 dynamics defined in this paper. The land use diversity of zone i during period T is assumed to be
 187 a function of land stocks of various land use types formed at the beginning of period T , S_{ik}^T :

$$(2) \quad D_{id}^T = f_D(S_{i1}^T, \dots, S_{iN_{lu}}^T) \text{ and } S_{ik}^T = S_{ik}^{T-1} + \Delta S_{ik}^T$$

191 Type- hs households currently living in zone i and dwelling type k and working in zone j in
 192 period $t-1$ will have two choice alternatives in time step t :

- 193 1) continue living in zone i and dwelling type k and working in zone j , and obtain a one-time-
 194 step utility $U_{ijk|h}^t$.
- 195 2) change i , j , and/or k at the beginning of period t to (i', j', k') , $(i, j, k) \notin \{(i', j', k')\}$. In the
 196 current period, $t-1$, the household pays all associated relocation costs, including moving and
 197 search costs (financially and physiologically), \mathcal{U}_{RL}^{t-1} . If households relocate only their
 198 residences, the relocation costs \mathcal{U}_{RL}^{t-1} are assumed to relate less to their new residence than to
 199 a function of land rents of neighborhoods they are living in, i.e., $R_{ik}^{t-1,2}$.

201 The forward-looking households would maximize their expected utilities from time step t_T with
 202 a utility discount rate, μ , by making a sequence of residence-workplace-building type decisions
 203 $\{(i, j, k)\}_{t_T}^{t_T+J}$, under a budget constraint on income and time, in each time step t in period T . The
 204 optimization problem is as follows:

$$\max_{\forall \{(i,j,k)\}_{t_T}^{t_T+J}} E \sum_{t=t_T}^{t_T+J} \mu^{t-t_T} U_{ijk|hs}^t(C^t, q^t, \mathcal{U}_{RL}^{t-1}, \varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^t)$$

205 subject to the budget constraint:

$$(3) \quad \sum_{\forall z} \mathcal{P}_{z|ijhs}^t \left(p_{n_f z}^t, w_{jhs}^t, g_{iz}^t, G_{iz}^t \right) C_z^t + q^t R_{ik}^t = \mathcal{M}_{ijhs}^t \left(w_{jhs}^t, \mathcal{W}_{hs}^t, g_{iz}^t, G_{iz}^t \right)$$

207 where

- 208 $p_{n_f z}^t$ is the price of outputs from four producer types n_f (i.e., agriculture, retail,
 209 construction, and service sectors) produced in zone z in time step t ,
 210 w_{jhs}^t is the hourly wage rate paid to labor from household type hs in zone j in time step t ,
 211 \mathcal{W}_{hs}^t is the non-wage annual income per household that belongs to hs types in time step t ,
 212 g_{iz}^t is the round-trip monetary cost per person-trip from zone i to z in time step t .
 213 G_{iz}^t is the round-trip travel time per person-trip from zone i to z in time step t .
 214 $\mathcal{P}_{z|ijhs}^t$ is the full delivered price of a retail good z for a type- hs household residing in i
 215 and working in j in time step t , which is a function of $p_{n_f z}^t, w_{jhs}^t, g_{iz}^t, G_{iz}^t$, and

² This assumption can be also found in the empirical studies on the dynamic housing location choice models, such as Bishop (2008) and Bayer et al. (2011), since an important moving cost is the share paid to the real estate agent (e.g., 6% of the sales price, to split between seller's and buyer's agents).

216 \mathcal{M}_{ijhs}^t is the full income of household type hs residing in zone i and working in zone j ,
 217 which is a function of $w_{jhs}^t, \mathcal{W}_{hs}^t, g_{iz}^t, G_{iz}^t$.

218
 219 The one-period optimization problem represents that households' current decisions are made
 220 relying not only on current-time-step utility but also on future-steps utility. Assuming the
 221 behavior of a household demonstrates perfect foresight, the decision-making outcome at the end
 222 of each period would fully reflect the future and a household can be modeled as looking forward
 223 one period at a time (e.g., a household's current decision in period t will be affected by their
 224 expected utility in time step $t+1$, but not affected by those after the time step $t+1$). This
 225 assumption makes the optimization problem tractable and solvable. Thus, the lifetime expected
 226 utility can be represented by the value function in Eq. (4), which obeys the Bellman equation
 227 (1957):

228
 229 (4) $V_{ijk|hs}^t = \max_{d_{ijk}} (v_{ijk|hs}^t + \varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^t)$

230 where

231 (5) $v_{ijk|hs}^t =$
 232 $u_{ijk|hs}^t + E \left\{ \max \left[U_{ijk|h}^{t+1}(u_{ijk|hs}^{t+1}, \varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^{t+1}), U_{i'j'k'|h}^{t+1}(u_{i'j'k'|h}^{t+1}, \varepsilon_{i'j'k'|h}^{t+1}) - \mathcal{U}_{RL}^t; (i, j, k) \notin \right. \right.$
 233 $\left. \{(i', j', k')\} \right\}$

234
 235 The first part of the RHS in Eq. (5), $u_{ijk|hs}^t$, represents the realization component of the utility
 236 function in period t , while the second part represents the expected utility maximization in period
 237 t by choosing (or not choosing) to relocate. Assuming that the idiosyncratic error term $\varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^{t+1}$ is a
 238 distributed as an *i.i.d.* Type 1 Extreme Value term, Eq. (5) can be written as follows:

239
 240 (6) $v_{ijk|hs}^t = u_{ijk|hs}^t + \mu \ln \left\{ \exp(u_{ijk|hs}^{t+1}) + \sum_{\forall d_{i'j'k'} \neq d_{ijk}} \exp(u_{i'j'k'}^{t+1} - \mathcal{U}_{RL}^t) \right\}$

241
 242 Solving Eq. (4) under the budget constraint (3), one can derive the direct utility function
 243 $\bar{U}_{ijk|hs}^t = \bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^t + \varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^t$ at the optimized choices for floor space and retail quantities produced.
 244 $\hat{u}_{ijk|hs}^t$ is thus calculated as follows:

245
 246 (7) $\bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^t =$
 247 $\alpha_{hs} \ln \alpha_{hs} + \beta_{hs} \ln \beta_{hs} + \ln \mathcal{M}_{ijhs}^t - \beta_{hs} \ln R_{ik}^t + \frac{\alpha_{hs}(1-\eta_{hs})}{\eta_{hs}} \ln \left(\sum_{\forall z} l_{z|ijhs}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_{hs}}} (\mathcal{P}_{z|ijhs}^t)^{\frac{\eta_{hs}}{\eta_{hs}-1}} \right) +$
 248 $I_{ijk|hs}^t$

249
 250 In each period T , the model assumes that the city evolving over the time steps t_T to t_{T+T} will
 251 reach a stationary state general equilibrium. Let $\bar{v}_{ijk|hs}^T$ be the *stationary* state value function in
 252 period T :

253 (8) $\bar{v}_{ijk|hs}^T = \bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^T + \mu \ln \left\{ \exp(\bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^T) + \sum_{\forall i'j'k' \neq ijk} \exp(\bar{u}_{i'j'k'|hs}^T - \mathcal{U}_{RL}^T) \right\}$

254
 255 Given that $\varepsilon_{ijk|hs}^{t+1}$ follows an *i.i.d.* Gumbel distribution, the stationary state choice probability in
 256 period T is of a multinomial logit form:

$$(9) P_{ijk|hs}^T = \frac{\exp(\lambda_{hs} \bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^T) \left[\exp(\bar{u}_{ijk|hs}^T) + \sum_{\forall i', j', k' \neq ijk} \exp(\bar{u}_{i' j' k'|hs}^T - u_{RL}^T) \right]^{\lambda_{hs} \mu}}{\sum_{\forall (a,b,c)} \left\{ \exp(\lambda_{hs} \bar{u}_{abc|hs}^T) \left[\exp(\bar{u}_{abc|hs}^T) + \sum_{\forall i', j', k' \neq ijk} \exp(\bar{u}_{i' j' k'|hs}^T - u_{RL}^T) \right]^{\lambda_{hs} \mu} \right\}}, \sum_{\forall (i,j,k)} P_{ijk|hs}^T = 1$$

If one ignores the model's relocation disutility term (i.e., $U_{RL}^T = 0$) and the exogenously and endogenously changing variables (of land use mix and population) between time points, the household-side model is the same as that of RELU.

Firms

The model assumes that a firm's decision of how much to innovate in current period T is affected by other firms' technological diffusion, and can affect a firm's future innovation decisions (Figure 1). This setting refers to Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014), who modeled spillovers and agglomeration externalities in an endogenous growth model based on abstract space. This type of dynamic mainly stems from the changing endogenous agglomeration externalities that arise from knowledge spillover varying over space (across locations) and between periods³. This type of agglomeration economy and dynamic are apparently not discussed in existing *applied* land use and transportation models, though the agglomeration economies from knowledge spillover and proximity to people (rather than intermediate goods) become increasingly important in understanding the location choices of firms and workers (Glaeser, 2010).

There are \mathcal{R} types of basic industries, including agriculture, manufacturing, business, and retail. Firms thus can be categorized as $\mathcal{R} + 2$ types, by adding construction and demolition firms⁴. The production function of the type- r ($r=1, \dots, \mathcal{R}+2$) firm with output X_{rj} in zone j in period T is shown in Eq. (10):

$$(10) \quad X_{rj}^T = (A_{rj}^T)^Y F(K_{rj}^T, L_{hs|rj}^T, B_{k|rj}^T, Y_{rj}^T)$$

where

- A_{rj}^T is the technology level of type- r firm in zone j ;
- K_{rj}^T is the capital used as an input in production by type- r firm in zone j ;
- $L_{hs|rj}^T$ is labor of skill group s used as an input in production by type- r firm in zone j ;
- $B_{k|rj}^T$ is floor space of type k ($k = n_r + 1, \dots, n_k$) used as an input in production by type- r firm in zone j ; and
- Y_{rj}^T is the intermediate input in production by type- r firm in zone j .

As shown in Figure 1, technology diffuses between time periods. This diffusion h is assumed to be local and to decline exponentially with distance. Let A_{rj}^{T-1} be the technology used in type- r firms in zone j in period $T-1$. In the next period T , the type- r firms in zone j have access to (but do not necessarily use) technology \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T :

$$(11) \quad \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T = \max_{\forall i} \{ \exp(-\delta g_{ij}) A_{ri}^{T-1} \}$$

³ Other sources of agglomeration externalities are endogenized in the model, as they are in the RELU model (Anas and Liu, 2007), including those that come from reducing the costs of moving intermediate goods over space and those that come from reducing the costs of accessing workers (via commuting costs).

⁴ RELU has a more detailed category of construction and demolition firms than used here, based on different building types.

294

295 Assuming the type- r firm in zone j can access the new technology \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T at the beginning of period
 296 T , this firm can decide to invest in a probability $\theta_{rj}^T \leq 1$ of innovation at cost $Z(\theta_{rj}^T, w_{js}^T)$. After
 297 the investment in innovation, the firm has a probability of θ_{rj}^T to obtain an innovation and a
 298 probability of $(1 - \theta_{rj}^T)$ to obtain no effect. Thus A_{rj}^T is the expected technology level during the
 299 period T , conditional on \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T , as follows (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014):

$$(12) \quad A_{rj}^T(\theta_r, \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T) = E(\text{innovation} | \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T) + E(\text{no effect} | \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T) = \frac{\sigma_r \theta_{rj}}{\sigma_r - 1} \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T + \\ (1 - \theta_{rj}) \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T = \left(\frac{\theta_{rj}}{\sigma_r - 1} + 1 \right) \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T, \text{ for } \sigma_r > 1$$

302

303 Firms maximize the expected present value of profits with discount factor φ . The optimization
 304 problem of a type- r firm in zone j at time T is therefore:

$$\max_{\{K_{rj}^T, L_{s|rj}^T, B_{k|rj}^T, Y_{rj}^T, \theta_{rj}\}_{T_1}} E \sum_{T=T_1}^{\infty} \varphi^{T-T_1} \left\{ p_{rj}^T [A_{rj}^T(\theta_r, \mathcal{A}_{rj}^T)]^Y F(K_{rj}^T, L_{hs|rj}^T, B_{k|rj}^T, Y_{rj}^T) - \rho K_{rj}^T \right. \\ \left. - \sum_{s=0}^S w_{js}^T L_{s|rj}^T - \sum_{k=0}^S R_{jk}^T B_{k|rj}^T - \sum_{r'=1}^{\mathcal{R}-1} \sum_{j'=0}^{N_z} (p_{r'j'}^T + \vartheta_{r'} g_{j'j}^T) Y_{r'j'|rj}^T - Z(\theta_{rf}^T, w_{rj}) \right\}$$

305 subject to a target output X_{rj}^T given by the production function (10).

306

307 **Land Developers**

308 Following RELU, land developers are modeled as looking forward 1 year at a time. In the model,
 309 the developers can perfectly foresee the capital gains of two types of investment decisions:
 310 construction (keeping the land undeveloped *versus* constructing a type- k building) and
 311 demolition (keeping the land use unchanged *versus* demolishing an existing building). In
 312 addition, the investment decisions pertaining to land use are closely related to citywide real
 313 estate policies and land use regulation. For example, many U.S. metropolitan areas have zoning
 314 ordinances that typically limit building heights and lot coverage, in favor of building low-
 315 density, single-use neighborhoods. Some high-density and mixed-use neighborhoods thus are
 316 “zoned out” under such zoning regulations (Levine, 2006). To model such zoning effects, we
 317 define an alternative set \mathbb{z}_i that includes the building types that are allowed in the modeled zone i
 318 under the zoning regulations.

319

320 **Market Clearing within Each Period**

321 The model in this paper assumes that the markets of products, labor, and real estate rental are
 322 clearing in each period T . First, when the three markets of basic industrial products (e.g.,
 323 agricultural, manufacturing, and business) are clearing, the aggregate output of type- r
 324 ($r=1, \dots, \mathcal{R}-1$) basic industry in zone i X_{ri}^T can be used as an intermediate input to any other type-
 325 r' ($r'=1, \dots, \mathcal{R}+2$) industries in zone i' or exported outside the modeled city, \mathbb{E}_{ri}^T .

$$(13) \quad \sum_{r'=1, \dots, \mathcal{R}+2} \sum_{i'=1, \dots, N_z} Y_{ri \rightarrow r'i'}^T + \mathbb{E}_{ri}^T = X_{ri}^T, \quad \forall r = 1, \dots, \mathcal{R} - 1$$

326

327
 328 Under the condition of product market clearing, the aggregate output of the retail industry equals
 329 the aggregate demand of retail goods:

$$(14) \quad \sum_{\forall hs} \mathbb{N}_{hs} \sum_{\forall i', j, k} P_{i'jk|hs}^T C_{i|i'jk}^T + \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{R}i}^T = X_{\mathcal{R}i}^T$$

331

332 The equilibrium outputs of the construction and demolition industries will equal the demand for
 333 construction and demolition in land development:

$$334 \quad (15) \quad X_{\mathcal{R}+1,i}^T = \sum_{\forall k \in \mathbb{Z}_i} m_k S_{i0}^T Q_{i0k} (Y_{i0}^T, Y_{i1}^T, \dots, Y_{iN_z}^T)$$

335 and

$$336 \quad (16) \quad X_{\mathcal{R}+2,i}^T = \sum_{\forall k=1, \dots, n_k} S_{ik}^T Q_{ik0} (Y_{i0}^T, Y_{ik}^T)$$

337 where Q_{i00} , Q_{i0k} , and Q_{ik0} are the probabilities of keeping land undeveloped, developing the
 338 vacant land to a type- k building ($k \in \mathbb{Z}_i$), and demolishing a type- k building ($k = 1, \dots, n_k$).

339 Second, when the real estate rental markets are clearing, the demands for residential and
 340 commercial floor space need to equal their supplies in each zone i , respectively.

$$341 \quad (17) \quad \sum_{\forall hs} \mathbb{N}_{hs}^T \sum_{\forall j} P_{ijk|hs}^T b_{ijk|hs}^T = S_{ik}^T \frac{r_o(R_{ik}^T, \mathbb{O}_{ik}^T)}{r_v(\mathbb{V}_{ik}^T) + r_o(R_{ik}^T, \mathbb{O}_{ik}^T)}, k = 1, \dots, n_r$$

$$342 \quad (18) \quad \sum_{\forall hs} B_{k|ri}^T = S_{ik}^T \frac{r_o(R_{ik}^T, \mathbb{O}_{ik}^T)}{r_v(\mathbb{V}_{ik}^T) + r_o(R_{ik}^T, \mathbb{O}_{ik}^T)}, k = n_r + 1, \dots, n_k$$

343

344 Third, the labor market clearing also requires that the annual demand and supply for the labor
 345 hours of skill- hs groups needs to be equal:

$$346 \quad (19) \quad \sum_{r=1}^{\mathcal{R}+2} L_{hs|rj}^T = \mathbb{N}_{hs}^T \sum_{\forall i,k} H_{ijf}^T P_{ijk|f}^T$$

347

348 ***Transitional Dynamics***

349 From periods T to $T+1$, the land stocks of type- k buildings and the production technology level
 350 of type- r firms at zone i will change endogenously, and the population numbers of type- hs
 351 residential groups are given exogenously. For example, the construction and demolition activities
 352 are assumed to be finished at the end of period T and the land stocks are updated at the beginning
 353 of period $T+1$, as follows:

$$354 \quad (20) \quad S_{ik}^{T+1} = \begin{cases} S_{i0}^T Q_{i00} + X_{\mathcal{R}+2}^T, & \text{if } k = 0 \\ S_{ik}^T - S_{ik}^T Q_{ik0}, & \text{if } k \notin \mathbb{Z}_i \\ S_{ik}^T - S_{ik}^T Q_{ik0} + m_{ik} S_{i0}^T Q_{i0k}, & \text{if } k \in \mathbb{Z}_i \end{cases}$$

355

356 Eq. (20) shows that the amount of vacant land of type- k building in zone i in period $T+1$ equals
 357 to the amount of the undeveloped vacant land kept in period T and the demolished building. For
 358 those land use types excluded by zoning regulation in period T , their new land stocks in period
 359 $T+1$ may decrease due to the possible demolition activities. For those ‘‘zoned-in’’ land use types,
 360 their new stocks equal the old stocks plus the new construction minus demolition stocks in the
 361 previous period. These settings differ from those in the RELU model. The model here assumes
 362 that building stocks change incrementally over time, while the RELU model solves for
 363 equilibrium building stocks so that the construction stocks equal the demolition stocks in the
 364 long term. In addition, this setting of building stock conversion here allow for modeling the
 365 effects of policy intervention.

366

367 The changes in stocks of different buildings lead to new zone-based land use characteristics,
 368 such as land use mix. Here, we use the index of land use mix entropy that is widely used in the
 369 planning field to measure the zone-based land use mixture, D_{i1}^{T+1} :

$$370 \quad (21) \quad D_{i1}^{T+1} = - \sum_{\ell=1}^{\mathbb{L}} \mathcal{L}_{i\ell}^T \ln \mathcal{L}_{i\ell}^T / \ln \mathbb{L}$$

371

372 where $\mathcal{L}_{i\ell}^T$ ($\ell = 1, 2, \dots, \mathbb{L}$) represents the proportion in type- ℓ land use area in total land area.
 373 Notice that the land use area is not equivalent to the floor space outcomes, S_{ik}^T , but can be
 374 calculated by them. In the following simulation, we define six types of land use in a zone
 375 ($\mathbb{L} = 6$), including single-family, multi-family, industrial, commercial, open space, and civil
 376 uses. Among them, the land areas of open space and civil uses are exogenously given, and those
 377 of the rest are calculated by S_{ik}^T and the FAR m_{ik} .

378
 379 Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 1, the technology levels of type- r firms at zone i (Eq. 12) are
 380 assumed to be updated at the beginning of period $T+1$, due to innovation diffusion (Eq. 11) and
 381 the firms' investment in innovation during period T . Both the transitions in technology level and
 382 land use characteristics can affect the wage levels, product and asset prices, and land rents,
 383 leading to new zone-based job-housing ratios, D_{i2}^{T+1} :

384 (22)
$$D_{i2}^{T+1} = \frac{\sum_{\forall h,s} \mathbb{N}_{hs}^T \sum_{\forall i',k} P_{i'ik|hs}}{\sum_{\forall h,s} \mathbb{N}_{hs}^T \sum_{\forall j,k} P_{ijk|hs}}$$

385
 386 **CALIBRATION AND SIMULATION**

387 The model is calibrated and applied in the Texas capital metropolitan area, including 38 Multiple
 388 Listing Service (MLS) neighborhoods (covering the City of Austin and Travis County) as
 389 modeled zones and 4 outer zones (representing 4 counties near the Travis County). The MLS
 390 neighborhoods have been defined based on real estate traditions, school zones, zip codes,
 391 housing stock consistencies, and natural boundaries (like rivers). Figure 2 shows the
 392 geographical distribution of the 38 MLS neighborhoods in the urban core (12 zones), inner
 393 suburbs (16 zones), and outer suburbs (10 zones).

394
 395 **[Figure 2 about here]**

396
 397 The starting period for simulation is 2005–2010, and the starting parameters are mainly
 398 calibrated using 2008 land use data from City of Austin, 2005 travel diary and OD data from
 399 Capital Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, demographic data from the 2010 census, and
 400 estimated population projection data (until 2050) from the Texas Data Center. While these data
 401 sets cannot fully support the parameter calibration for the model here, some parameters (e.g.,
 402 filmographies) refer to existing literature (e.g., Anas and Rhee, 2006; Zhou and Kockelman,
 403 2011; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014) and come from empirical estimates. In each policy
 404 scenario, the simulation includes five periods (from 2010 to 2035) and each period covers 5
 405 years.

406
 407 The applied model here consists of nine population groups: three lifecycle stages (defined by the
 408 household head, who is the household's one worker) across three skill levels. The numbers of
 409 households (or housing units) in each of these groups are exogenously given and estimated using
 410 data from the 2010 Census and the Texas Data Center's population projections data (through
 411 2050). The shares of starter-home households (with household heads up to 34 years old) and
 412 peak-demand households (35–64 years old) will decrease, while the share of downsizing
 413 households (older than 65 years) will almost double, from 2010 to 2035. In addition, we define
 414 four types of residential buildings (low- and high-density single-family and multi-family uses)
 415 and calculate the occupied and vacant land stocks and floorspace based on the future zoning
 416 maps obtained from the City of Austin (COA, 2010).

417

418 The algorithm used to solve for 1,110 within-period equations refers to Anas and Liu (2007),
419 while the calculation of transitional dynamics follows equations (26)-(28). The population
420 numbers N_{hs}^T are exogenously given at the beginning of each period. The variables S_{ik}^T , D_{i1}^T ,
421 D_{i2}^T , A_{rj}^T are given at the starting period and calculated at later periods based on corresponding
422 updates inform prior periods. Within each period, the endogenous variables, such as product
423 prices and output levels, land rents, wages, and property values and rents, are solved recursively
424 to clear product, labor, and real estate markets. The Newton-Raphson algorithm is used
425 recursively to find the fixed point solutions of those endogenous variables. The run time for
426 finding such spatial equilibria within a period on a standard personal computer ranges from 5 to
427 10 minutes, depending on the initial values used.

428

429 **LAND USE AND RENT DYNAMICS UNDER FOUR SCENARIOS**

430 This section compares the land use, housing demand, and rent dynamics from 2015 to 2035
431 every 5 years, under four scenarios with different assumptions. The first scenario (S1) assumes
432 that the household groups have variant preferences for housing size but no preference for a
433 neighborhood with mixed-use features. For example, the peak-demand group's utility elasticity
434 of housing size is higher than that of the starter-home and downsizing groups. The second
435 scenario (S2) assumes that the household groups have variant preferences for both housing size
436 and a neighborhood with mixed use features (including land use mixture index and job-
437 population ratios). By comparing S1 and S2, one can determine how demographic trends affect
438 city land use and housing demand. The third and fourth scenarios (S3 and S4) add a low-density
439 zoning regulation to S1 and S2, respectively. This low-density zoning regulation is assumed to
440 exclude the development of high-density residential property in the 10 MLS neighborhoods in
441 the Austin's outer suburbs. By comparing S1 and S3 and S2 and S4, one can examine how the
442 supply constraints on high-density development affect land use, housing demand, rents, and
443 property values.

444

445 **Land Use Dynamics from Demographic Changes and Zoning Regulations**

446 Simulation results suggest that city land use dynamics are closely connected with people's
447 changing preference for various land use features, changing demographics, and changing land
448 use supply as affected by land use regulations and planning. These changing preferences can be
449 either exogenously given or endogenously determined and probably cannot lead to a stationary
450 dynamic spatial equilibrium even in the long term, especially when location externalities on
451 consumption and production sides and land development policies exist and vary over location
452 and time.

453

454 **[Figure 3 about here]**

455

456 First, we compare the land use dynamics under Scenarios 1 and 2. S1 includes only the
457 exogenous population growth as the source of urban dynamics. The simulation results show that
458 the household densities across most of the 12 inner core neighborhoods significantly increase
459 from 2015 to 2035 (Figures 3a). In S2, when residents prefer to live in more mixed-use
460 neighborhoods (introducing another location externality, as a source of dynamics, as shown in
461 Figures 3b), future population appears more centralized (than those of S1). Table 1 summarizes
462 the land use difference in the inner core, inner suburban, and outer suburban neighborhoods of

463 S1 and S2. These findings suggest that a rising demand for mixed-use environments may
464 increase core population and levels, while lowering them in the suburbs, yet improve land use
465 diversity in the suburban areas at the same time.

466
467 **[Table 1 about here]**
468

469 Second, we examine the “zoned-out” effects by comparing the land use dynamics before and
470 after low-density zoning regulations in the outer suburban areas. Here, the land use regulation
471 can be regarded as an exogenous constraint on urban development. The comparison of Figures
472 4a and 4c appears to show that such a zoning regulation may increase urban population densities
473 at the early stage but will not greatly affect the density distribution over longer periods. In
474 contrast, the zoning regulation appears to have more significant effects on the spatial distribution
475 of employment densities. Table 1 also provides a summary of land use change after zoning
476 regulation. When households have no mixed-use preference, at the early stage (2015–2020) the
477 low-density zoning regulation will centralize more households in the urban core and inner
478 suburban areas and decrease population in the outer suburbs. At later stages of development
479 (2025–2035), both urban and outer-suburban household counts fall, as these households move to
480 the inner suburban area. Meanwhile, many potential employment opportunities would be zoned
481 out by such a regulation, especially in the outer suburban areas. But such regulations may
482 reinforce urban agglomeration economy by attracting more firms and employment. In summary,
483 the predicted demographic trends suggest that the low-density zoning regulation may encourage
484 population decentralization alongside employment centralization, causing citywide job-housing
485 mismatch and urban sprawl.

486
487 If demand for smaller houses and mixed-use neighborhoods rises but their supply is constrained
488 by land use regulations, do these trends aggravate urban sprawl? These simulations, comparing
489 S2 and S4, yield some mixed results. Households seem to still centralize in the urban core,
490 though the shares of households in the inner suburbs grow from 2015 to 2035. The employment
491 distribution also shows a centralization trend. Compared to S2, more jobs in the inner suburbs
492 will move to the urban area than from the outer suburbs. Though high-density residences are
493 regulated by the zoning ordinances, the mixed-use demand may increase the supply of mixed-use
494 neighborhoods with job-housing balance, thus leading to relatively matching trends of population
495 and employment distribution. These findings suggest that when the real estate market realizes
496 residents’ preferences for mixed-use neighborhoods, the negative sprawling effects of land use
497 regulation may be mitigated.

498 **Trends of Housing Demand and Rent**

500 Table 2 shows the projected trends of housing demand, rent, and property price from 2015 to
501 2035 in Scenario 1. When the demographic change is the only dynamic factor, the growth rates
502 of low-density single-family (LDSF) housing units are higher than those of other housing types
503 before 2025. But after that, the demand for high-density multi-family and single-family housing
504 increases at a faster rate. Table 3 compares the trends of housing demand from four scenarios. By
505 comparing S1 and S2, one can find that the demand for LDSF housing decreases when the
506 mixed-use preference is realized in the market. The demand for other housing types will rise,
507 with the demand for high-density multi-family (HDMF) homes increasing the most. The effects
508 of zoning regulation on housing demand seem much smaller than the realization of mixed-use

509 preference. At the early periods, the constraint on high-density development will decrease the
510 LDSF demand. But in the long term, such a land use regulation will increase LDSF demand and
511 lower other housing demand. After comparing S2 vs. S1 and S4 vs. S2, we find that the low-
512 density zoning may mitigate the decreasing trends of LDSF housing demand.

513

514

[Tables 2 & 3 about here]

515

516 In S1, the housing rents of four building types will increase initially and drop later, while their
517 property price will keep increasing from 2015 to 2035, though the growth rate will decrease
518 (Table 3). Table 3 also compares the housing rent trends between S2 and S1 and S3 and S1.
519 Differing from housing demand, the demand for mixed-use neighborhood will significantly
520 increase the rents of low-density multi-family (LDMF) and high-density single-family (HDSF)
521 housing. The zoning regulation will raise the HDSF housing rent most. These findings suggest
522 that the supply constraint on high-density development may raise the housing rents of such high-
523 density housing.

524

525 **CONCLUSIONS**

526 This paper developed a dynamic spatial equilibrium model to compare changes in land use
527 patterns, housing demand, and rents over a 20-year period for the Austin, Texas metropolitan
528 area under four distinctive scenarios, assuming different agent preferences and land use policies.
529 When compared to existing dynamic SEMs (e.g., Anas and Liu, 2007; Martínez and Henríquez,
530 2007), this new model introduces more land use details and more dynamics for land use change.
531 For example, the specification tracks not just different housing sizes and access attributes, but
532 also several location externalities (e.g., land use diversity, job-housing balance, and production
533 externalities emerging from innovation diffusion) that affect agent (household and firm)
534 decisions. In addition, the model allows for three dynamics that affect spatial choice, including
535 exogenously provided demographic details, building stock conversion (as constrained by zoning
536 regulations), and endogenously evolving location externalities. These modeling improvements
537 help respond to many agent-based modelers major critiques (e.g., Simmonds et al., 2013), and
538 demonstrate the ability of applied SEMs to reflect more realistic land use complexity and urban
539 dynamics.

540

541 The scenario analyses mainly explore the effects of demographic trends, land-use preferences,
542 and low-density zoning regulations on the dynamics of land use, housing demand, and rents, and
543 their related welfare implication. Simulation results suggest that people's rising demand for
544 mixed-use neighborhoods may improve land use diversity in suburban areas and lower demand
545 for low-density single-family housing across a region. Low-density zoning regulations in
546 Austin's outer suburbs may lead to citywide job-housing imbalances and urban sprawl (with
547 population decentralizing and jobs potentially centralizing) while raising high-density housing
548 rents. But such regulations do not appear to affect housing demand much, especially in the
549 longer term. When existing low-density zoning regulations cannot be changed (in the short
550 term), promotion of mixed-use development may increase households' preference for mixed-use
551 environments and thus moderate tendencies towards more excessive urban sprawl.

552

553 Several modeling limitations still merit further exploration. First, further simulation analyses
554 should discuss the effects of transitional costs (e.g., residential moving costs) and innovation

555 diffusion on scenario results described above. Although this study focuses on methodological
556 innovation, more sensitivity analyses are needed, to support the realistic land use policy analysis.
557 Second, this paper does not quantify welfare effects (or their distribution) across different
558 scenarios. Ideally, future research will extend these calculations to provide efficiency
559 information and welfare outcomes of various land use policies (including changes to zoning
560 regulations and subsidies for alternative development).

561

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637

638

Table 1 Land use comparisons between scenarios

	Land Use	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
With and without mixed-use preference (S2 vs. S1)						
Urban Core	HH. NO.	45.69%	22.66%	26.73%	23.25%	24.11%
	Emp. NO.	1.88%	1.32%	1.38%	1.33%	1.43%
	LU Mix	-0.88%	-0.04%	-0.54%	0.26%	-0.31%
	JHR	-36.38%	-19.69%	-28.60%	-23.02%	-25.87%
Inner Suburbs	HH. NO.	-14.87%	-6.61%	-7.70%	-6.56%	-6.80%
	Emp. NO.	-4.32%	-2.19%	-3.30%	-2.99%	-3.32%
	LU Mix	0.15%	0.12%	-0.15%	0.16%	0.06%
	JHR	5.98%	0.11%	0.84%	0.24%	0.40%
Outer Suburbs	HH. NO.	-12.77%	-7.34%	-8.81%	-7.99%	-8.40%
	Emp. NO.	-4.72%	-4.55%	-4.11%	-4.18%	-4.37%
	LU Mix	4.77%	5.84%	5.97%	6.28%	6.36%
	JHR	5.08%	2.37%	5.05%	4.87%	5.28%
With and without exclusionary zoning regulation (S3 vs. S1)						
Urban Core	HH. No.	0.37%	0.16%	-0.02%	-0.12%	-0.20%
	Emp.No.	7.75%	7.61%	7.48%	7.57%	7.69%
Inner Suburbs	HH. No.	0.28%	0.28%	0.27%	0.22%	0.18%
	Emp.No.	-1.53%	-2.58%	-3.18%	-3.36%	-3.49%
Outer Suburbs	HH. No.	-0.64%	-0.49%	-0.34%	-0.20%	-0.09%
	Emp.No.	-34.44%	-35.96%	-37.11%	-37.57%	-37.91%
With and without exclusionary zoning regulation (S4 vs. S2)						
Urban Core	HH. No.	2.79%	2.18%	2.24%	2.31%	2.27%
	Emp.No.	1.19%	1.53%	1.69%	1.65%	1.56%
Inner Suburbs	HH. No.	-0.42%	0.20%	0.38%	0.52%	0.59%
	Emp.No.	-5.91%	-7.36%	-7.51%	-7.54%	-7.34%
Outer Suburbs	HH. No.	-2.78%	-2.34%	-2.73%	-2.94%	-3.03%
	Emp.No.	-0.45%	-0.94%	-2.01%	-1.79%	-1.46%

640 Note: The proportions were calculated using a rate of change: (land use variables of S2 – variables of S1) / variables
641 of S1
642

643
644

Table 2 Changes in housing demand, rent, and property prices from 2015 to 2035 under Scenario 1

	2015 (no. of housing units)	2020 (% change in 2015-20)	2025 (% change in 2020-25)	2030 (% change in 2025-30)	2035 (% change in 2030-35)
<i>Housing Demand</i>					
Low-Density Single-Family	246,041	10.02%	8.50%	6.81%	5.69%
High-Density Single-Family	90,922	9.80%	8.33%	7.17%	5.98%
Low-Density Multi-Family	74,581	9.70%	8.23%	7.08%	5.92%
High-Density Multi-Family	23,739	9.69%	8.27%	7.42%	6.18%
<i>Housing Rents</i>					
Low-Density Single-Family	4.20	8.60%	6.51%	-0.21%	-0.50%
High-Density Single-Family	5.10	9.73%	8.11%	0.53%	-0.80%
Low-Density Multi-Family	7.50	8.63%	6.32%	-0.35%	-0.30%
High-Density Multi-Family	10.81	10.64%	9.14%	1.30%	-0.49%
<i>Property Prices</i>					
Low-Density Single-Family	178.75	10.12%	8.59%	6.87%	5.73%
High-Density Single-Family	97.79	9.71%	8.24%	7.10%	5.93%
Low-Density Multi-Family	82.36	9.58%	8.12%	7.01%	5.87%
High-Density Multi-Family	142.53	9.38%	8.03%	7.30%	6.09%

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646

647

Table 3 Percentage changes in housing demand across paired scenarios

	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Housing Demand Comparisons					
With and without mixed-use preference (S2 vs. S1)					
Low-Density Single-Family	-6.99%	-4.27%	-4.81%	-4.44%	-4.61%
High-Density Single-Family	9.39%	5.22%	5.96%	5.23%	5.48%
Low-Density Multi-Family	3.57%	2.77%	3.38%	3.38%	3.53%
High-Density Multi-Family	25.25%	15.71%	16.66%	15.38%	15.61%
With and without exclusionary zoning regulation (S4 vs. S2)					
Low-Density Single-Family	-1.25%	-1.02%	-1.08%	-1.14%	-1.14%
High-Density Single-Family	1.24%	1.13%	1.34%	1.44%	1.47%
Low-Density Multi-Family	1.01%	0.87%	0.78%	0.80%	0.76%
High-Density Multi-Family	2.84%	2.43%	2.39%	2.48%	2.46%
Housing Rent Comparisons					
With and without mixed-use preference (S2 vs. S1)					
Low-Density Single-Family	-1.31%	5.51%	3.07%	4.89%	3.92%
High-Density Single-Family	16.97%	27.30%	26.22%	28.76%	27.79%
Low-Density Multi-Family	76.04%	82.70%	74.64%	77.68%	75.61%
High-Density Multi-Family	-2.41%	8.91%	4.93%	5.87%	4.87%
With and without exclusionary zoning regulation (S3 vs. S1)					
Low-Density Single-Family	-3.01%	-0.24%	1.94%	2.58%	3.13%
High-Density Single-Family	19.61%	22.87%	25.08%	25.42%	26.21%
Low-Density Multi-Family	-3.75%	0.34%	4.64%	6.72%	7.21%
High-Density Multi-Family	-4.26%	-1.79%	-0.24%	-0.35%	0.02%

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
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Note: The proportion numbers are calculated by change rate. For example, the numbers in S3 vs. S1 are calculated as (land use variables of S3 – variables of S1) / variables of S1.


Slow Changes: Land Use, Innovation Diffusion, & Demographics



Faster Changes: Residential & Job Mobility, Goods & Assets Price, Rent, Wage, & Transport

Figure 1 Model dynamics


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Figure 2 Austin, Texas' 38 MLS areas


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(a) Household density in S1 (with exogenous population growth only)


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(b) Household density in S2 (S1 + preference for mixed-use environments)

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(c) Household density in S3 (S1 + low-density zoning regulation)

665 **Figure 3** Differences in household density over time (year 2015 to 2035), across three scenarios

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(S1 vs. S2 and S1 vs. S3)

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